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Much of the discussion in economics is concerned with growth. Economic growth can be 
discussed and measured in terms of a national state. It can be also discussed and measured in 
terms of a corporation, (often using the term value rather than growth). Development Economics 
is concerned with growth of countries run by governments; International Business is concerned 
with the behavior and the value of multinational enterprises run by management. This paper is 
about the interface between the two. The vehicle used in this paper to explore the interface is a 
comparative analysis between two very influential books; “The Strategy of Development” by 
Hirschman, (1958), and the “Future of the Multinational Enterprise” by Buckley and Casson, 
(1976). The main argument of the paper is that Development Economics and International 
Business do approach a very similar issue, but they do it from two different dimensions 
perpendicular to each other. Looking at the whole picture, (the matrix as a whole rather than 
along the two separate vectors), gives the observer a more meaningful picture. This is done in the 
paper through a critical comparison of the two texts focusing on the two dimensions on 
internalization, growth and internalization, investment choices and strategies, and multinational 
enterprises and the dynamics of development.  
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1.  The Different Path of Development Economics and International Business: An 
Introduction and a Literature review 
 
  In their book “The Future of the Multinational Enterprise”, (1976), Buckley and Casson have 
developed some of the most important concepts in the study of the economics of the 
multinational enterprise, (or the multinational corporation to use the American term). Following 
the path-breaking early work of Stephen Hymer, (1976), and the following analysis of 
Kindleberger, (1969), and Caves, (1971), Buckley and Casson established the concept of 
internalization as the organizing and explanatory paradigm of the development and the 
international expansion of the multinational enterprise. The popularity of the concept of 
internalization in the study of the multinational enterprise is evidence to the success of their 
approach. (A recent issue of JIBS, vol. 34, issue 2, 2003, was devoted to their work). 
 
  Buckley and Casson are taking the national states, their markets, and the factors of production 
they control as inputs in the investment decisions of MNEs. Thus MNEs maximize profits in an 
imperfect market comprises of many national states. Imperfections in this market are man-made 
and not a natural phenomenon, (although internalization can be the result of physical 
impediments as well).  In many cases the imperfections are originated, or supported by national 
states as a part of their policies. Governments are utilizing existing imperfections, and introduce 
some new laws and regulations as policy tools. (For a discussion of the way that governments are 
using such instruments see Globerman and Shapiro, 1999).  
 
  Sixteen years before the publication of Buckley and Casson’s book Hirschman has published 
his book: “The Strategy of Development”, (1958). At the time of the publication of his book 
Hirschman was one of the major figures in Development Economics both in the conceptual 
dimension as a researcher and as a Professor of Economics, and in the applied dimension as a 
consultant to the World Bank. Like “The Future of the Multinational Enterprise” Hirschman’s 
book was very popular and influential. (By 1972 it was reprinted 15 times). Hirschman’s book, 
as well as many other publications, seminars, and policy papers have contributed in forming a 
“view of the world” in the 60’s in a similar way that Buckley and Casson’s work and all the 
following developments of the concept of internalization have contributed to the International 
Business “view of the world”.   2
 
    Although the Development Economics “view of the world” and the International Business 
“view of the world” seem to be very different, some will say opposites, this is not the case. 
Hirschman and Buckley and Casson are coming from different branches of economics, they are 
focusing on different dimensions, and most important they write and do research in a different 
social, political, and economic environment. Yet, they are dealing with a similar situation, and 
being good economists they are coming to similar conclusions. 
 
    This paper is about the common basic economics that is common to both Development 
Economics and International Business. The focus is on Buckley and Casson and on Hirschman 
because by being excellent proponents of their respective “view of the world” they provide us 
with insights regarding the interface between International Business and Development 
Economics, an interface that generates a fuller and more complex “view of the world”. In 
Development Economics the active party is the national state that maximizes the welfare of its 
residents, and in International Business the active party is the multinational enterprise (MNE) 
that maximizes the value of its shareholders. By combining both “views of the world” the result 
is a more complex, but more real world where the focus is on the interaction between state and 
MNE and the state and people act as maximizers in the two organizations to whom they belong; 
the state and the MNE.  
 
  This is done in this paper through a comparative analysis of the two books: “The Strategy of 
Development”, (1958), and “The Future of the Multinational Enterprise”, (1976). However, the 
critical analysis of the two books is used as an intellectual container only. The message goes 
beyond the authors and the books. The message is that Development Economics (DE) and 
International Business (IB) have focused each on one dimension of a global issue: how 
production, (in the most inclusive definition), is distributed among countries, (IB), and how it 
affects global income distribution, (DE). Reading Buckley and Casson 1976 book side by side 
with Hirschman 1958 book contributes to a better understanding of the world at the beginning of 
the 21
st century. The two books put together symbolize the winning combination of International 
Business and Development Economics as a way to generate an economic world view of the 
complex world of our time.   3
 
   Both Development Economics and the economics of International Business were developed in 
a certain time frame in history. They reflect temporal needs and provided answers to current 
questions at their time. In the post WWII period modern national states perceived the economic 
welfare of their citizens as a part of their responsibility. This is true for most national states, 
developed and developing. The literature of Development Economics provides us with a 
discussion of the ways by which national states act to do that. (Although the discussion in the 
literature is focused on developing countries it can be easily extended to developed countries as 
well). Development Economics grew up as a field of economics as a result of the process of 
industrialization in developing countries in the post WW II period. Following the political and 
social concepts of the time, as well as the need to rebuild many countries after the war and the 
end of the colonial period, the focus was on government policies and how they can affect the 
welfare of the people residing in a given state. 
   
  Globalization as an economic, social, and political theme came later. It grew up together with 
the liberalization of trade and capital flows in the last third of the 20
th century. The focus was on 
free market as represented by the Monetarists and similar approaches to economic policy. The 
preferred vehicle of growth, and implicitly of income distribution was the MNE that transcends 
political borders. The aim of the MNE as a firm is to maximize the wealth of its shareholders, 
(according to the narrower definition of financial economics), or that of its stakeholders, 
(according to the broader view of the organizational theory paradigm). The economics of 
International Business that was developed hand in hand with the progress of liberalization and 
integration in the world’s markets. The economics of International Business provides analytical 
tools and concepts that goes together with the idea that the firm and its shareholders are the focal 
point of economic activities. Maximizing the value of firms will bring about maximum welfare 
for all. At the extreme the world becomes one “global village” where the free market reigns 
supreme.  
   
  Yet, as Kobrin (2000) argues the MNEs themselves are creatures of the division of the world 
into national states. The mere term Multinational Enterprise indicates a world divided into 
national states.   4
 
   The beginning of the 21
st century has shown us that globalization and liberalization did not 
create the euphomistic “global village”. In a dialectical way the process of globalization 
emphasizes the function of the government as a representative of the residents in a given state. 
Nationalism is on the rise. Yet, the process of globalization did create real multinational 
enterprises with their own constituency and their own power base. In economics like in physics 
any movement creates a counter-movement. The concentration of power at the MNEs resulted in 
more power at the hands of the national state. One outcome of this process is an oligopolistic 
market where only large organizations, national states and MNEs can compete effectively. In 
such a market internalization and negotiation are two complementary key phrases. (For a formal 
analysis of such a model see Agmon and Khouri, 1991). 
 
      Governments do look at the MNEs of the world as potential providers of production, 
distribution, R&D and other forms of knowledge, all of them are sources of income and welfare 
for their residents.  One way by which governments act to maximize their objective function is 
by enticing firms to locate production, R&D, and other income-producing activities within their 
borders. Governments maximize the welfare of their citizens subject to a vector of possible 
location decisions by managements of MNEs. MNEs look at governments as providers of 
location advantages from the physical to the fiscal. Managements of MNEs maximize  their 
value subject to a vector of possible locations for each and every activity from production, to 
distribution, to R&D. (A formal model of such a world is presented and discussed in Agmon, 
2003). 
 
  The traditional growth literature is macroeconomic by nature. It focuses on issues like the rate 
of savings in a given country, on monetary policy, exchange rate and such like. When 
development economists become more involved in the actual process of development they had to 
consider micro issues like investment strategy and specific policy choices. A good example of 
the attempt to examine issues of development economics from a more concrete point of view is 
presented and discussed in Balassa’s discussion of the dynamics comparative advantage as a part 
of the process of development, (Balassa,1989). But even when Balassa discusses the competetive 
advantage of firms, the discussion is presented in the context of macroeconomics. Balassa argues   5
in a series of articles that the changes in the comparative advantage of a number of developing 
countries in the 60’s and the 70’s was a result of an accumulation of specific capital in certain 
industries. Such an accumulation was often the outcome of import substitution and export 
promotion decisions by the government of these countries, but also the result of foreign direct 
investments (FDI) decisions by MNEs.  
 
  By the mid-70’s when the study of the MNE became popular, the economics of International 
Business was rooted at Industrial Organization. By that time Development Economics was not a 
part of the mainstream research in economics.  Krugman (1995) has suggested that this was 
partly due to the inability to deal with the issues of development economics in the framework of 
market equilibrium models. As a result of this break between Development Economics and 
International Business the literature on the location decisions of MNEs in the International 
Business literature regards national states and their policies as static impediments rather than 
active players. An example for this approach is Braunerhjelm and Ekholm, (1999), where the 
authors state at the beginning: “Over recent decades, foreign direct investment (FDI) has become 
a major force in the global economy. The geographical pattern of capital formation, trade and 
technological spillover across countries and regions, are to an increasing extent determined by 
the strategies chosen by multinational firms.”, (p.1). Development Economics would have 
suggested that governments act directly and indirectly in order to locate certain economic 
activities of MNEs within their borders, and that the geographical pattern of production, 
distribution, and R&D by MNEs ia the result of governments’ policies. 
 
      The literature of international business did not ignore national states and the issue of the 
relations between states and MNEs. Early in the 70’s Vernon “Sovereignty at Bay”, (1971), set 
up the stage for the discussion of the problems caused to national states by MNEs. Twenty years 
later Stopford and Strange, (1991), developed a different approach to the issue of the interface 
between state and firm. They started their book with six general propositions. The first 
proposition is that states compete for means to create wealth, and the second is that the 
evolvement of MNEs affects the way that states compete for wealth. In the final chapter of their 
book Stopford and Strange provide advice both to governments and to MNEs how to deal with 
the structural changes of globalization, and the tension between globalization and “localness”.    6
   
  In a recent paper Kobrin argues that all through the second part of the 20
th century MNE were a 
part of the national-state system. True, as was argued by Vernon and many others, MNEs and 
national states differ in their objectives. The development and the growth of the MNE makes it 
very difficult, if not impossible, to national state to execrsize full autonomy in their policy 
decisions. But “at the end of the day MNEs are international or cross-borders entities which are 
very much of the existing interstate system firmly rooted in national territorial jurisdiction.” 
(Kobrin, 2000, p. 3). Kobrin reinforces the view that although oftentimes there is a conflict 
between MNEs and national states, there are actors within the same system, sharing similar core 
values. 
 
  Neoclassical economics has taught us that international trade is based on factors of production, 
and in particular on factor intensity. Development Economics and International Business deal 
with a detailed analysis of how countries and MNEs create combinations of factors of production 
such that they generate and maintain comparative competitiveness, for MNEs, and comparative 
advantages, for countries. Comparative competitiveness and comparative advantage are the two 
dimensions of a value (welfare) generating matrix that both MNEs and governments are trying to 
attain. Discussing the interface between these two dimensions by exploring both International 
Business and Development Economics contributes to a better understanding of the current 
process of growth and income distribution in the world.   
 
  Rereading Buckley and Casson together with Hirschman enriches our understanding of how 
states and firms interact in creating value (welfare) in the world. This is done in two ways. First, 
it introduces the national states as active players into the Industrial Organization internalization 
paradigm used as an explanation for the growth of the MNEs. This makes the internalization 
model dynamic and interactive. Second, it makes a connection between the theory of the MNE as 
presented by Buckley and Casson and developed further by others later, and Development 
Economics. This connection  places the growth of the MNE in a broader historical perspective. 
This perspective helps to understand the way by which MNEs grew in the second part of the 20
th 
century by looking at the MNEs as a continuation of a process of growth and the move from a 
close to an open economy system. This perspective contributes to a better understanding of what   7
may happen in the first part of the 21
st century. (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990, provide an 
example of a dynamic model that begins with import substitution and ends with international 
business activities).  
 
The remaining of the paper consists of the following four sections:     
 
2.  The Two Dimensions of Internalization 
3.  Balanced growth, Unbalanced Growth, and the Economics of Internalizing a Market 
4.  Internalization, Internationalization of the Firm and Investment Choices and Strategies 
5.   MNEs and the Dynamics of Development  
 
2.  The Two Dimensions of Internalization 
   
  Internalization, as the name suggests, is the replacement of a perfect market for an output or an 
input where all transactions are at arm-length at the market price by some internal arrangement 
where prices are determined by an agreement rather than by the invisible hand of the market. 
When a processing firm buys a mine that supplies the raw material for the processing, 
internalization may follow. Where a national state creates profit opportunities by regulations 
such that a certain production activity is located within its borders internalization may follow as 
well.  
 
  At the beginning of Chapter 2 in their book Buckley and Casson state the three main postulates 
of their internalization model: 
 
“ (1) Firms maximize profits in a world of imperfect markets. 
   (2) When markets in intermediate products are imperfect, there is an incentive to   
         bypass them by creating internal markets. This involves bringing under common 
         ownership and control the activities which are linked by the market. 
    (3) Internalization across national boundaries generates MNEs.” (Buckley and Casson, 1976,  
p. 33). 
   8
  In a section titled “ The Paradox of the Internalization Doctrine” Hirschman writes that: 
“ It states that, under the private enterprise system, entrepreneurs in underdeveloped countries 
will invest far less than is profitable from the point of view of society…(Therefore) Production 
must be integrated and centrally planned as though it were taking place in a single “trust”, for 
only in that case are the external economies going to be “internalized” with a consequent upward 
revision of profit estimates” (Hirschman, 1958, p. 55). Many governments today find central 
planning an inefficient way to internalize. But the wish to internalize by other means as a way to 
attract desirable FDI persists. 
 
  Buckley and Casson present one dimension of the internalization process. Hirschman presents 
another dimension. But in both cases internal arrangements replace the markets, (in the sense of 
adherence to prices determined in complete and perfect markets). A firm may decide to locate 
production in a certain country as a part of its internalization process. This same decision may 
contribute to the process of internalizing some externalities within the borders of this country. In 
this case the decision of the MNE to internalize a part of the production and service chain within 
a given country may be independent of the interest of the government of the same country to 
internalize the same part of the chain of production within its borders. 
 
   In this way MNEs and governments provide internalization services for each other. Each of the 
actors, MNEs and governments, is trying to maximize its objective function. In a static model, 
each party is taking the decisions of the other actor as given. (For an example for this type of a 
model see the Introduction to the Symposium Multinationals: The Janus Face of Globalization, 
(Eden and Lenway, 2001). A more dynamic approach is to view this issue as a subject of a 
negotiation between the national state and the MNE. This is represented in the economic 
literature by game theoretic models. The solution of such models is not unique and is not stable. 
Using the definition of Scitovsky’s “Two Concepts of External Economies”, (Hirschman, p.65), 
the fact that many MNEs report positive profits indicates a “chain of disequilibria”. “A chain of 
disequilibria is a feature of imperfect market. (In a perfectly competitive market all excess profits 
will disappear.)”, (Hirschman, Ibid). The chain of disequilibria also implies that one expects to 
observe a continuous process of change in location of production, in the distribution of R&D   9
across countries, and in the ownership structure of MNEs. The business history of the last quarter 
of the 20
th century is consistent with this expectation. 
 
   Internalization by firms and by governments is expressed in “abnormal” high rates of profits 
for firms and of growth for countries. In other words, successful firms and successful 
governments generate and sustain “abnormal” profits from a temporary oligopolistic situation. 
The details may and do vary from one country to another. What is working for one country may 
be different that what is working for another country. MNEs do differe in their spatial expansion 
policy as well. South Korea in the 1980’s is one example of the ability to generate and maintain 
high rate of growth. Singapore is another, Israel in the period 1995-2000 is yet another example 
where each country has found its own way to generate abnormally high rates of growth for a 
while in conjunction with FDI by MNEs. MNEs also found their specific strategies to generate 
abnormally high rates of share price appreciation. Some went the way of establishing wholly 
owned subsidiaries. Some opted for a joint venture startegy with local corporations, yet others 
build up their startegy on outsourcing.    
 
  In a somewhat more formal sense, the situation in the world market can be described as follows. 
Two groups of actors are operating in a set of imperfect markets. One group, the national states, 
has some monopolistic power over their own jurisdiction. The monopolistic power is expressed 
in controlling entry to their jurisdiction, and in the ability to tax, to regulate, and to discriminate 
among industries and firms. The second group, the MNEs has some monopolistic power over 
some proprietary factors of production, (i.e. knowledge), and intermediate goods and processes, 
(i.e. marketing channels). Governments are trying to internalize the relevant external economies 
and to avoid the diseconomies by offering a package of incentives to foreign firms. Firms are 
trying to internalize their ownership advantages by choosing the right activities to internalize and 
the right locations for them, and at the same time to avoid the diseconomies of internalization.  
The diseconomies are the outcome of fragmented markets and complex organization. MNEs are 
maximizing the value of their stakeholders. Governments are maximizing the economic welfare 
of their citizens as a way to ensure reelection. It is assumed that both governments and the 
managements of MNEs are acting rationally. As Buckley and Casson say: “The optimal 
scale,(and set of locations), is set at the margin where the costs and benefits of further   10
internalization are equalized.” Hirschman shares the same view where he says about 
internalization that: “However, if the repercussions include losses, (pecuniary external 
diseconomies), they will ordinarily will be internalized along with the gains and it is no longer 
certain where we will come out.”. 
  
  As all firms are located in one or more of the countries in the world, it is clear that there is a 
solution that satisfies all participants in the market, national states and MNEs. However, it is 
likely that there is no one optimal solution but many possible solutions and the observed (ex 
post) solution in any given pont of time depends on the sepcifics of the situation, or it may be 
randomly chosen from the set of possible solutions. This is due to the oligopolistic nature of the 
world market. (For a game theoretic analysis of oligopolistic market and a multiequilibria 
solution see Selten, (1999)). An application of a game theoretic approach to negotiation between 
states and MNEs is in Agmon (2003)).  An added complexity is that all the stakeholders of the 
MNEs are also citizens in one of the countries in the world. That means that their welfare as 
stakeeholders may increase by the same action that decreases their welfare as citizens. An 
example is a decision of a MNE to relocate production in order to internalize some advantages 
that cannot be attained by arm-length exports. That may end with the same person losing a job as 
an employee and gaining value as a shareholder of the same MNE. 
 
   The way that the international distribution of the ownership advantages of MNEs changes over 
time, and the resulting changes in the number, the size, and the activities of the MNEs, depends 
crucially on the path of the development of the countries in which the MNEs operate. On the 
other hand, the pattern of development of national states depends on the internalization decisions 
of the MNEs. It is possible to specify a formal model to describe the actors, their potential 
moves, and to examine possible optimal strategies. Such models are found in game theory. 
Usually, they require specific and restricting assumptions to be tractable. An example is a model 
of a multistage game model with delay supergames. This situation is described as: “In a delay 
supergame decisions on all strategic variables are made in the same time, period after period, but 
this decision become effective with different delays. Thus, in period t decisions on the price in 
t+1 and the capacity in t+10 may be made, on both variable at the same time and simultaneously 
by all players. In a delay supergame the players have full information about previous history of   11
the play, but not about simultaneous decisions made by other players. All decisions made in a 
period become publicly known at the beginning of the next period.”, (Selten, (1999), p.5). It is 
not trivial to set the problem of the interface and the competition between national states and 
MNEs in the restricted structure of a specific oligopolistic game like the delay supergame. It is 
even more difficult to interpret the solution, or in this case the many possible strategies that may 
lead to equilibrium. It is beyond the exploratory and descriptive nature of this paper to develop 
such a model and to test it both in the analytical and the empirical sense. It is sufficient in this 
stage to point out that the technology to set up and to analyze and test specific game theoretic 
models that deal with the interface between the internalization policies of national states and 
MNE do exist. Such  models may provide a formal meeting ground for the firm oriented 
internalization theory of the MNE and Development Economics interpretaion of internalization 
with its emphasis on growth and government policies. 
 
 
3.  Balanced Growth, Unbalanced Growth, and the Economics of Internalizing a 
Market 
 
  This section begins with a discussion of two important features one in Buckley and Casson, and 
one in Hirschman. Buckley and Casson present five types of market imperfections that create 
incentives for firms to internalize rather than to act through arm-length transactions in the 
market. The presentation and the analysis of the ‘balanced growth’ and the ‘unbalanced growth’ 
model are central to Hirschman’s discussion of development economics. The differentiation 
between ‘balanced’ and ‘unbalanced’ growth as a policy choice variable indicates imperfect 
competition. It is shown in this section that by combining Hirschman’s and Buckley and 
Casson’s models one gets a more complete picture of the imperfections that brings out 
internalization as an interactive process between MNEs and governments. 
 
According to Buckley and Casson the five types of market imperfections that lead firms to 
internalize are: 
 
1.  The absence of developed future markets.   12
2.  The ability to exercise price discrimination 
3.  The existence of bilateral bargaining situations 
4.  Differences in information available to different parties 
5.  Barriers to trade 
 
  Examining these sources for market imperfections, it can be seen that all of them are related, 
though not exclusively, to the exercise of power by national states. 
 
  The absence of future markets is a sign of a restricted, or an undeveloped capital market. This is 
often a result of government control and regulations. In a world with no control, and free 
movement of capital and of information, all investors in all the countries will have an access to a 
one unified capital market, including future markets. 
 
    The ability to exercise effective price discrimination is often associated with an import 
subsistution and an export promotion policy. In such a case the government allows a firm to sell 
in a higher price in the domestic market as a way to prevent imports or to induce the firm to 
export and sell in a competitive price in external markets. This was a common feature of export-
led growth in many countries. In many cases export-led growth has been a forerunner of  FDI. 
(On this point see Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990).   
 
  It is a common practice for MNEs to enter into a bilateral bargaining with governments as a 
part of the decision process where to locate production, distribution centers, or a R&D facility. In 
many cases the bargaining concerns reduced taxes, grants, participation in the cost of labor 
through training programs and such like. Changes in the prices of tradable and non-tradable 
factors of production as a result of the bilateral bargaining between the government and the MNE 
will affect location decisions by the firms. (See Buckley and Casson, pp. 49-50). 
 
  Information plays an important role in negotiations. It is also an all important factor in the 
specification of most game theoretic models like the one mentioned above.   Differences in 
information can work in various ways. In some cases the government may have information 
about its future policies, objectives and prospects that the MNE does not have. In other cases the   13
MNE may posses private information that a government does not have. As it is shown in 
Buckley and Casson such situations give rise to internalizing by firms, in particular to 
internalizing across national borders which is the essence of the MNE. Governments may want 
to internalize based on information about future decisions not known to the public as of now. 
 
    Barriers to trade are almost always the result of government policy and they are a direct 
outcome of the monopolistic power of the national state. They are also a major reason for 
internalization across borders. 
 
  Looking at the same issue from a different point of view is through the discussion of ‘balanced’ 
and ‘unbalanced growth’ provides another dimension on the issue of market imperfection. The 
theory of ‘balanced growth’ in Development Economics says that due to either supply 
considerations, like the lack of infrastructure, or demand considerations, like lack of absorptive 
income, a project that may contribute to national growth like a power station cannot succeed 
unless it is coordinated with other projects. For example, in order to justify an investment in a 
power station there is a need for an investment in a cement factory that will come on stream at 
the same time and will take up the slack in the demand due to low income and low demand for 
electricity. The investment in a cement factory through a FDI will also contribute to employment 
and tus for the demand for electricity by households. The ‘Internalization Doctrine’ of 
development economics says that the market cannot supply this condition and therefore the 
government has to step in and internalize the process by creating “artificial” market conditions. 
In other words, the government has to create a situation where a MNE with knowledge and 
marketing channels in the production of cement will decide to locate a production facility in that 
country. 
 
    The theory of “balanced growth” requires the government to create a complex set of 
preconditions like the one described above. Hirschman, argue that ‘balanced growth’ is 
unattainable, or that it leads to a no-growth policy. The alternative option is a policy of 
‘unbalanced growth’. A policy of ‘unbalanced growth’ means that the government lets the 
corporate sector to lead the growth, where different sectors may lead the growth in different 
periods.   14
 
  ‘Unbalanced growth’ means breaking away from the restrictions on both the supply and the 
demand. It means investing in projects even if the infrastructure is not there, and at the time of 
the investment there is not enough income to buy the output resulting from the investment. 
 
   Hirschman’s theory of ‘unbalanced growth’ was created at the time where FDI was in its 
infancy stages. This was so particularly regarding FDI in developing countries. As FDI 
developed and become more global with the development of outsourcing it makes what may look 
as ‘unbalanced growth’ from a point of view of one country feasible from the point of view of 
the MNE as a global system. By their nature MNEs can use their internal infrastructure, like 
logistics, distribution services, and internal financing to compensate for the lack of infrastructure 
in a certain country. In many cases the output produced by MNEs is exported, often as 
intermediate goods through their internal markets, or as consumer goods that are sold to the 
internal distribution channels of the MNEs. In this way MNEs provide both the infrastructure 
and the demand for the products that they manufacture in a given country. Thus what may appear 
as ‘unbalanced growth’ creates income and welfare for the residents of developing countries 
where MNEs have locate production. The MNEs enjoy positive profits, partly in return for their 
infrastructure and marketing services. Such a solution is what one expects in an oligopolistic 
market. The issue is how the profits of internalization are divided between the citizens of the 
country where ‘unbalanced growth’ investment is taking place, and those stakeholders of the 
MNEs who are not citizens in the country in question. This important issue of income 
distribution is not discussed here. It should be recognized, however, that much of the current 
discussion about globalization focuses on the question: who gets what? (For a preliminary 
discussion of this issue see Agmon, 2003).  
    
  The internalization process is an outcome of a joint effort by firms and by governments to 
maximize their objective functions in an imperfect market. Governments often generate market 
imperfections. The imperfections are utilized both by firms and by governments to further their 
goals. In some cases the goals of the two actors, MNE and government, create a mutually 
beneficial situation. ‘Unbalanced growth’ is one such case. To quote Hirschman: “it is the role of   15
foreign capital to enable and to embolden a country to set out on the path of unbalanced 
growth”.,( Hirschman, p.205). In many cases FDI does exactly that. 
 
   
4.  Internalization, Internationalization,  Investment Choices and Strategies 
 
  In the last section of chapter two, the chapter that sets up the theory of the MNE, Buckley and 
Casson states that: “ The theory developed above can be used to explain the pattern of the growth 
of the MNEs in the twentieth century. We shall argue that prior to the Second World War 
multinationality was a by-product of the internalization of intermediate-product market in 
multistage production processes, and that in the post-war period it is a by-product of the 
internalization of markets in knowledge.”,  (Buckley and Casson, p.59). 
 
    In his analysis of investment processes Hirschman focuses on the investment activity as a 
function of both supply and demand. In a chapter titled: “Growth Models and Development 
Process” Hirschman says: “Investment is a many sided actor on the economic scene. Its 
simultaneous performance as income-generator and capacity-creator is the foundation of modern 
growth theory. Now we will stress a third role which it plays occasionally on top of the other 
two: that of a pace-setter for additional investment.”, (Hirschman, p.41). 
 
  Although Hirschman is talking about investment in developing countries, his analysis is an 
appropriate description of the role of the MNEs in the process of development in the developed 
world as well. The “pace-setter” role of investment in development economics, also called by 
Hirschman the complimentarily effect of investment, is mirrored in the Industrial Organization 
approach to the MNEs.  
 
  Earlier, in section 3, a difference in information was presented as a source and a reason for 
internalization. In response to the oligopolistic theory of “follow the leader”, (Knickerbrocker, 
1973), Buckley and Casson present an alternative information- based proposition. “The firm with 
the best market-intelligence system will be the first to recognize the opportunity for investment 
and sooner or later will decide to exploit it, e.g., by relocating production in the region, (the   16
country).”, (Hirschman, pp.78-79). The exploitation is carried out by internalization. Often by 
bargaining with the government of the country in which the production is taking place.  
 
  To the extent that the investment is R&D based, as was the case many times in the process of 
the internalization of knowledge, the benefits for the country are large. As Hirschman points out: 
“The investments of one period call forth complimentary investments in the next period with a 
will and a logic of their own; they block out a part of the road that lies ahead and virtually 
compel certain additional investment decisions.”, (Hirschman, p. 42). 
 
    Buckley and Casson argue that the internalization of knowledge can explain much of the 
growth and the international expansion of the MNEs. Hirschman has shown that knowledge-
based investment is a powerful tool of development for a country due to the complimentary 
effect of investment. Thus it makes sense for a government to allow a firm to attain “abnormal” 
profits through internalization as a way to promote growth.  
 
  In terms of the “delay supergame” referred to above, the firm and the government may have 
different delay periods. MNEs may have short-term profits in mind by locating R&D based 
operation in a certain country, whereas the government of the country may take a longer-term 
view of complimentary and spill-over effects. 
 
  One way of differentiating between MNEs and national states is by their horizons. In principle 
governments are responsible for the future generations as well as for their current citizens. From 
a growth theory point of view it does make sense to “pay” for current investment by MNE, by 
grants, tax relief and such like, in order to create the base for future FDI that will contribute for 
further growth. In this respect internalization that will bring in FDI contributes to internalization 
of the country where the investment is located, and to future growth. In many cases the strategy 
and the investment choices of the government, based on long-term growth pattern, and the 
strategy of the MNE, maximize value subject to internalization, coincide. 
 
 
   17
5.  MNEs and the Dynamics of Development 
 
    The main idea expressed in this paper is that our understanding of the growth and the 
development of the MNEs in the second part of the 20
th century gains from examining the MNEs 
in the context of development economics. This is done in the first four sections of this paper by a 
comparative analysis of Buckley and Casson and of Hieschman. In this section the two 
approaches are merged where MNEs are presented as a part of the process of development. 
 
  There are several ways to present the sequence of development. A common way to do so in the 
literature of development economics is to begin with a closed economy and import substitution, 
and as the country is growing it moves to export-led growth and then to open markets and global 
operations. In the language of economic development this is presented as a process of opening up 
the economy, or moving from a close to a global economy. (For a discussion of this process see 
Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990).  
 
  As the national economy becomes more open, the monopoly power of the government declines. 
Going back to the five sources of internalization presented above, all of them, maybe with the 
exception of the fourth, differences in information, decline in importance as the barriers among 
countries become less pronounced. This means, to use Buckley and Casson terminology, that the 
incentive to internalize across borders declines. As, according to Buckley and Casson, 
internalization of markets across national boundaries generates MNEs, a decline in the incentive 
to internalize across national boundaries should reduce the activities of MNEs, or change the 
nature of the MNE in a significant way.  
 
  There is an interesting dialectics in the argument presented above. The process of opening up of 
the world economy, or the decline in the barriers among national states is aided by the 
investment decisions of the MNEs. This is so because MNEs provide bridges for the flow of 
information, money, people, and goods and services across borders. As Vernon (1971) has 
argued, the process of reducing barriers that lies in the center of the activities of the MNEs is 
what make them a threat to government control. Yet, MNEs depend for their existence on the 
national state as an organization that maintains sovereignty over a well-defined geographical   18
area. The stronger is the control of the national state, ceteris paribus, the larger is the incentive of 
the MNE to internalize by making an investment in this state. The higher is the level of 
investment by MNEs in a given state, ceteris paribus, the weaker is the control of this state, and 
the less relevant is its geopolitical uniqueness. This is not a surprising result. Often, in 
monopolistic competition the actions taken by firms to realize the “abnormal” profits of the 
situation erase the imperfection that created the oligopoly in the first place. 
 
  The development theory, and the practice of development policy by governments, went through 
changes as well. The move from import substitution, to export-led growth and to global 
operations creates more connections among states and eroded the monopolistic power of the 
states. To use the term of Hettne, (1995), development theory was globalized. Some 
governments respond to the pressures of globalization by linking with other governments to 
create larger political organizations, but maintaining the geographical continuity and the political 
power of the state. (The European Union is the best example of this process).  
 
  The post- WWII world was shaped by the interaction between national states and MNEs. The 
focus of the economic research has changed following the evolving reality. Two dialectical 
forces, nationalism and globalization affected the second half of the 20
th century. Development 
Economics provided a conceptual economic structure for government policies and attaining 
national goals. The economics of International Business provided a conceptual structure for the 
development of the MNE and attaining value maximization for shareholders and stakeholders 
alike. Reading Buckley and Casson and Hirschman together shows that by combining the 
interests of both national states and MNEs, and by integrating elements from Development 
Economics with elements from the economics of International Business our understanding of 
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